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GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN MARYLAND: A
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO MAKING AND
DEFENDING TORT CLAIMS
Karen J. Krugert

INTRODUCTION
Tort suits that involve the government as a party necessarily
require the advocates to consider the impact of sovereign immunity
on the litigation. 1 For practitioners who represent governmental
entities and employees as defendants, sovereign immunity is an
important defense, as it can serve to deprive a court of jurisdiction
and completely deter a lawsuit. 2 Those who seek to sue the
government must have a command of the waivers of sovereign
immunity for which the law provides and be aware of the
procedural requirements that often accompany those waivers in
order for a suit to even be filed.
Maryland appellate courts have explained that the Maryland
doctrine of sovereign or governmental immunity "has survived
repeated challenges over the years and remains a formidable
obstacle to those who attempt to sue a governmental entity,,,3 and

t

\.

2.

3.

Senior Assistant County Attorney, Harford County, Maryland; L.L.M. in Law &
Government, Washington College of Law, American University; J.D., Rutgers
University School of Law. I am indebted to Professor Jeremy Mullen and my
classmates at Washington College of Law who offered valuable support and
assistance with the early drafts of this Article.
This Article does not address the questions of governmental immunity, or lack
thereof, in contract actions. Some resources for practitioners to consult with
respect to contract claims include: MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-201 (2004)
(barring use of sovereign immunity defense in contract actions); MD. CODE ANN.,
art. 25B, § 13A (2005) (barring the defense by Maryland counties for certain
actions); Harford County v. Town of Bel Air, 348 Md. 363, 372-73, 704 A.2d
421,425-26 (1998); ARA Health Servs., Inc. v. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr.
Servs .. 344 Md. 85, 91-95, 685 A.2d 435, 438-40 (1996) (waiving, to a limited
extent, state sovereign immunity in contract actions); Md.-Nat'l Capital Park &
Planning Comm'n v. Kranz, 308 Md. 618, 521 A.2d 729 (1987) (rejecting
immunity in contract actions for counties and municipalities); Harold J. Krent,
Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REv. 1529, 1560-78 (1992).
See, e.g., Koehler v. United States, 153 F.3d 263 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that
sovereign immunity deprives the courts of jurisdiction regardless of the merits of
the underlying claim); Ronsonet v. Carroll, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1015 (D. Miss.
2000) (stating that sovereign immunity deprives the court of jurisdiction);
Annapolis Urban Renewal Auth. v. Interlink, Inc., 43 Md. App. 286, 294, 405
A.2d 313, 318 (1979) (stating that sovereign immunity, as a substantive matter, is
a legal defense); Frosburg v. State Dep't of Pers., 37 Md. App. 18, 375 A.2d 582
(1977) (court held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity barred a suit against
the state employer for back pay); Davis v. Educ. Servo Ctf., 62 S.W.3d 890, 895
(Tex. App. 2001) (stating that the doctrine of sovereign immunity deprives the
court of subject matter jurisdiction).
Heffner v. Montgomery County, 76 Md. App. 328, 333, 545 A.2d 67,69 (1988).

37

Baltimore Law Review

38

[Vol. 36

that the immunity is "deeply ingrained in Maryland law.,,4 The
Court of Appeals described sovereign immunity as "[ 0 ]nce
venerated, recently vilified, and presently substantially limited, [it]
has long been recognized by this Court. We have applied the
doctrine for over a century . . . . ,,5. Indeed, one of the earliest
Maryland cases involving ~uestions of sovereign immunity was
decided over a century ago, and as recently as October 2006, the
Maryland Court of Appeals issued an opinion resolving questions
of governmental immunity. 7
This Article is a resource for practitioners in Maryland to
consult when facing litigation in which the doctrine of sovereign
immunity is an issue. It highlights the key features of the
variations in the law of sovereign immunity and governmental
waivers, with the goal of creating a starting point for litigants and
their attorneys. This Article is not intended to be a complete
treatise on the law of sovereign immunity in Maryland, but rather a
practical resource to provide practitioners with familiarity of the
Issue.
My own experience as a government attorney has shown that
Maryland litigators struggle with the theoretical underpinnings of
the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the various statutory and
jurisprudential exceptions to this immunity that relate to the civil
liability of the government and its employees. The nature of the
immunity and the conditions of waiver vary depending on which
government is being subjected to suit (i.e., federal, state, 8 or local),
with further variations dependent on the character of the cause of
action. The competent litigator must fully explore these issues
before filing or defending a suit, or she risks losing a claim or
defense.
Part I of this Article provides a general overview of the
historical foundations of the common law concept of sovereign
immunity. The skilled practitioner should understand these
concepts in order to apply the relevant legal principles and create
new approaches to litigation involving sovereign immunity to best
serve their clients' interest. Part II describes governmental waivers
of sovereign immunity; those waivers are limited and their nature
differs with the type of government or agency involved. This
section is divided first by way of the common governmental
hierarchy: federal, state, and municipal or local. In a second sub4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

See Nam v. Montgomery County, 127 Md. App. 172, 182, 732 A.2d 356, 362
(1999).
Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 53-55, 405 A.2d 255, 257 (1979).
See State v. BaIt. & Ohio RR. Co., 34 Md. 344 (1871), ajJ'd sub nom., BaIt. &
Ohio R.R. Co. Maryland, 88 U.S. 456 (1874).
See Mayor of Baltimore v. Whalen, 395 Md. 154,909 A.2d 683 (2006).
In this Article, the term "State" refers to the State of Maryland.

v,
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section, this Article discusses other "cross over" doctrinal and
practical matters that come into play-again depending on the type
of cause of action and the identity of the defendant( s).
1.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TO GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY, A BRIEF HISTORY

Sovereign immunity is the legal construct that provides
immunity to a government, protecting it from private lawsuits in
tort. 9 Although the general principle of sovereign immunity is
well-known, its origins and bases in the law are obscure. lo
Scholars have examined sovereign immunity for centuries, II and
although as a theoretical legal construct its historical foundation is
weak, sovereign immunity's role in contemporary jurisprudence
remains strong. 12
Although sovereign immunity may have some origin in Roman
law,13 it was certainly a part of early English common law,
evidenced by a commonly held belief that "the Crown can do no
wrong.'d4 This rationale was based on the idea that monarchs
9.

10.

I 1.

12.

13.
14.

See generally Fleming James, Jr., Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their
Officers, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 610 (1955) (examining the history, reasoning, and
policy of sovereign immunity); see Krent, supra note 1 (examining sovereign
immunity as a means to protect the political process and whether rescinding
sovereign immunity rules is desirable); see also Godwin v. County Comm'rs of
St. Mary's County, 256 Md. 326, 334, 260 A.2d 295, 299 (1970) (discussing the
applicability of the doctrine of sovereign immunity to the State, but also to its
agencies and instrumentalities for the purposes of preventing tort liability).
See Thomas A. Bowden, Comment, Sovereign Immunity from Statutes of
Limitation in Maryland, 46 MD.L. REV. 408, 409 (1987) (discussing the
underlying policies of sovereign immunity in a historical context).
See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
230 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765); KENNETH CULP DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONAL
TORTS 4-14 (1984); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE
HISTOR Y OF ENGLISH LAW 518 (2d ed. 1898); Jack Boger, Mark Gitenstein &
Paul R. Verkuil, The Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An
Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C. L. REV. 497, 507-10 (1976); Edwin M.
Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L.J. 1 (1924); Leon Thomas
David, The Tort Liability of Public Officers, 12 S. CAL. L. REV. 260, 283 (1939);
Kenneth Culp Davis, Tort Liability of Governmental Units, 40 MINN. L. REv. 751
(1956); Ludwik Ehrlich, Proceedings Against the Crown, 6 Oxford Studies in
Social and Legal History 9 (Sir Paul Vinogradoff ed., 1921); David E. Engdahl,
Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. COLO. L.
REv. I (1972-73); William Holdsworth, The History of Remedies Against the
Crown, 38 L.Q. REV. 141 (1922); LouisL. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and
Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1963); James, supra note 9;
Daniel C. Kramer, The Governmental Tort Immunity Doctrine in the United
States 1790-1955,1966 U. ILL. L. F. 795 (1966).
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN L. REv. 1201,
1202 (2001) ("[S]overeign immunity is not fading from American jurisprudence;
quite the contrary ... ").
See DAVIS, supra note II, at 1-5; ROBERT DORSEY WATKINS, THE STATE AS A
PARTY LITIGANT 2 (1927).
See WATKINS, supra note 13, at 11.
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were chosen and guided by divine providence, and thus did not
commit misdeeds. 15 For a subject to accuse the Sovereign of
illegal acts would have been contrafl to God's will, so the
Sovereign enjoyed complete immunity. I
Over time, the feudal idea that a king could not be sued in the
courts that he himself created 17 gave way to the notion that the
king was subject to the law, and "that the kinj was not only
capable of but disposed toward doing wrong." I Indeed, some
scholars have interpreted the expression "the king can do no
wrong" to actually mean that the "the king must not, was not
allowed, not entitled, to do wrong . . . . ,,19 Thus, medieval
Englishmen recognized that the king did commit wrongs, even if
he could not be sued in his .own courts without his consent. 20 They
sought redress from the Crown through "petitions of right," and
gradually a principle arose that "the king could not rightfully
refuse to grant a petition of right. ,,21
By the eighteenth century, evolving notions of the British
Monarchy set jurisprudential scholars to the task of defining the
changing nature of sovereign immunity. William Blackstone was
the best known of these commentators and "was widely read in
America both before and after the Revolution.,,22 Even modern
American case law continues to cite Blackstone's Commentaries,23
published in 1765. 24 Of course, one of the key premises of the
American Revolution was the colonists' rejection of the
Monarchy,25 and how monarchical sovereign immunity
transformed into American governmental immunity has been
called "one of the [great] mysteries of legal evolution.,,26
The solution to the mystery may be found in the fact that the
American states were deeply in debt as a result of the
Revolutionary War, thus creating a "good practical reason to
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.
22.
23.

24.
25.
26.

See Bowden, supra note 10, at 410.
Id.
See Engdahl, sitpra note 11, at 3.
Id.
Id. at n.7.
Id. at 3.
Id. (discussing the distinction between petitions of right and "mere petitions of
grace").
Id. at 4.
See, e.g., Godwin v. County Comm'rs of St. Mary's County, 256 Md. 326, 33031, 260 A.2d 295, 297 (1970) (quoting Blackstone's Commentaries to establish
the theory and application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in Maryland).
See BLACKSTONE, supra note 11.
See Chemerinsky, supra note 12, at 1201-02 (stating that the "United States was
founded on a rejection of a monarchy and of royal prerogatives").
Borchard, supra note 11, at 4. But see DAVIS, supra note 11, at 1-5 (stating that
"[t]he sole basis for immunity of the American democracy from tort liability has
been Blackstone's 1756 proposition: 'The king can do no wrong .... "').
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assume the doctrine's applicability without too much attention to
whether it fit the new polity, and most men who thought of the
matter at all were no doubt thus dissuaded from questioning its
validity. ,,27
The 1787 Constitution created a federal judiciary and a
jurisdiction that did not make any exception for cases in which the
defendant was either a state or the Union itselr,28 In 1793, the
United States Supreme Court considered whether a state could be
sued without its consent. 29 In Chisholm v. Georgia,30 four of the
five justices found that a state was subject to federal court
jurisdiction under the Constitution when being sued by citizens of
another state, whether or not the state had consented to suit. 31
Although the decision represented a reasonable interpretation of
the Constitution 32 in finding that it contained no explicit grant of
sovereifn immunity, the holding caused great turmoil among the
states. 3 States were suddenly faced with the possibility that they
could be exposed to suits arising from debts incurred during the
Revolutionary War-obligations that they could not possibly
meet. 34 In response, Congress passed the Eleventh Amendment in
1789. 35
In Cohens v. Virginia,36 Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "[t]he
universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or

27.

28.

29.
30.
31.
32.

33.

34.
35.

36.

Engdahl, supra note II, at 6 (noting also the limited exception to the doctrine
found in the Articles of Confederation for a special federal tribunal to settle interstate disputes).
/d. at 6 (quoting U.S. CaNsT., art. III, § 2, cl. I to indicate the power of the
permanent federal judiciary in controversies involving the Union or a state).
See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793), superseded by U.S. CaNST. amend.
XI.
/d.
[d. at 479-80; see also Engdahl, supra note II, at 7.
Curiously, in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. State Tax Comm 'n, Justice Frankfurter
mistakenly opined that "[sovereign] immunity from suit ... is embodied in the
Constitution .... " 327 U.S. 573, 580 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11 (1890) (discussing how the Chisholm
decision created such shock which ultimately led to the Eleventh Amendment to
the Constitution); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264,406 (1821) (discussing how
the American states' general alarm over Chisholm led to the proposal of the
Eleventh Amendment).
See Cohens, 19 U.S. at 406-07.
The Eleventh Amendment reads, in relevant part: "The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CaNsT. amend. XI.
States were empowered to preserve sovereign immunity and escape suit in its
own courts without its consent, and notions of comity and sovereignty saved each
state from being subject to judgments rendered by courts in another state. See
Engdahl, supra note II, at 8.
19 U.S. 264 (1821).
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In 1882, the Supreme

[W]hile the exemption of the United States and of
the several states from being subjected as
defendants to ordinary actions in the courts . . .
[has] been repeatedly asserted here, the principle
has never been discussed or the reasons for it given,
but it has always been treated as an established
doctrine. 38
In The Siren,39 the Court endeavored to justify the doctrine when it
said: "It is obvious that the public service would be hindered, and
the public safety endangered, if the supreme authority could be
subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen, and consequently
controlled in the use and disposition of the means required for the
proper administration of the government.,,40 States, too, invoked
the doctrine of sovereign immunity with little additional
justification. 41
In 1907, Justice Holmes noted:
Some doubts have been expressed as to the source
of the immunity of a sovereign power from suit
without its own permission. . .. A sovereign is
exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical
and practical ground that there can be no legal right
37.
38.
39.
40.

41.

Jd. at 411-12; see also Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. 386, 389 (1850).
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196,207 (1882).
74 U.S. 152 (1868).
Id. at 154; see also Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. 122, 126 (1868) (stating that
the "principle is fundamental, applies to every sovereign power, and but for the
protection it affords, the govemment would be unable to perform the various
duties for which it was created."); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18 (1890)
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a state by citizens of its
own, unless the state has consented thereto; sovereign immunity was already an
established legal principle at the time of the adoption of the Constitution).
Although the states surrendered some independence and sovereignty to the
federal union under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2, they did
retain sovereignty within their own borders. The Eleventh Amendment was an
attempt to define the limits of federal judicial power over the states. See LINDA
MULLENIX, MARTIN REDISH & GEORGENE VAIRO, UNDERSTANDING FEDERAL
COURTS & JURISDICTION 488 (1998); Kramer, supra note 11, at 810; see also
Commonwealth v. Colquhouns, 2 Hen. & M. 213, 216 (Va. 1808) (addressing
whether the Commonwealth was responsible for correcting the loss of tobacco
unlawfully converted by inspectors); Black v. Rempublicam, 1 Yeates 140, 14143 (Pa. 1792) (addressing the appeal from the settlement of an account against the
Commonwealth by the comptroller general and whether the Commonwealth was
properly chargeable in the suit). The first recorded case examining whether
municipalities have the privilege of sovereign immunity held that it does not. See
Lobdell v. Inhabitants of New Bedford, 1 Mass. 153 (1804). However, eight
years later, the court reversed itself. See Mower v. Inhabitants of Leicester, 9
Mass. 247 (1812).
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as against the authority that makes the law on which
the right depends. 42
Given that sovereign immunity is common law, courts have the
power to change it. 43 While some state courts have taken such
initiative, no federal courts have done SO.44 And although the
doctrine has been criticized,45 it has not been totally abrogated
either by judicial action or by statute. Indeed, some degree of
immunity for the government may be necessary to "maintain a
proper balance among the branches of the federal government ...
[and] to preserv[e] majoritarian policymaking and not from any
need to honor any hoary traditions. ,,46
Whatever the justification for sovereign immunity, it has deep,
if not dense, historical roots and it is an established part of the
American governmental system. 47 The states were the first to
enjoy the protection, then the federal government, and finally the
municipal levels of government. Immunity also extends to certain
governmental officials. 48 Federal 49 and state 50 legislators, and all
judges 51 have absolute and unqualified immunity, regardless of the
nature of their conduct.
Quasi-judicial officials, such as
prosecuting attorneys, have absolute immunity for their initiation
of a prosecution of a criminal case. 52 Other government officials
have been granted immunity, either by statute or through common
law. 53 To the extent that those immunities apply in Maryland, they
are addressed in the subsequent sections of this Article.
42.
43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

50.

51.

52.

53.

Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
See DAVIS, supra note II, at 1-7.
Id. at 1-7 to 1-8 (noting that by 1976, twenty-nine state courts "had abolished
chunks of sovereign immunity" and that thirty-four states have enacted statutes
affecting the immunity).
/d.; see also Krent, supra note I, at 1530-31.
Krent, supra note I, at 1530-31.
See Hill v. United States, 50 U.S. 386, 389 (1850).
See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (prosecutors enjoy
absolute immunity when acting within the scope of their authority).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. I; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 201
(1880) (stating that U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. I afforded the House of
Representatives protection from the alleged charge offalse imprisonment).
See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314-18 (1975) (discussing that state courts
have generally recognized that state school board officers should be protected
from tort liability under state law for all good-faith, nonmalicious action taken to
fulfill their official duties); see also Bailey v. Lally, 481 F. Supp. 203, 221-22 (D.
Md. 1979) (extending immunity to Maryland Delegates).
See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967) (stating that the immunity of
judges from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction is firmly rooted in common law).
See Paehlman, 424 U.S. at 431. However, prosecutors may have only qualified
immunity for acts committed when acting in the role of a criminal investigator or
administrator. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 520-22 (1985).
See, e.g., 28 U.S.c. § 2671 (2000) (military members and employees ofa federal
public defender organization are treated as employees of the government under
the FTCA); Jones v. Czapkay, 182 Cal. App. 2d 192, 205 (1960) (granting
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The immunity enjoyed by governments, their agencies, and
their employees derives from historical sovereign immunity, and is
now most often referred to as "governmental immunity.,,54
Maryland imported its concept of governmental immunity, 55 which
bars tort litigation against a sovereign, from this historical
foundation. 56 The legal principle is "alive and well in Maryland
today,,,57 but does not apply equally to all governmental units.
While the State of Maryland itself maintains "near-complete
immunity from tort litigation . . . [,] municipalities and counties
have a more limited immunity from such litigation.,,58
These differences and distinctions in state law are discussed at
length below, but now this Article turns its attention to the
sovereign immunity of the federal government, and the legislative
waiver of that immunity through the Federal Tort Claims Act,59
which later became the basis for a similar Maryland statute.
II. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN CONTEMPORARY
PRACTICE

A.

Congressional Waiver oj Sovereign Immunity on Behalf oj the
United States

1.

The History of the Federal Tort Claims Act

In 1855, Congress passed the Court of Claims Act,60 its first
acknowledgement that absolutely barring suits a~ainst the federal
government was impractical and perhaps unfair. 6 This Act made

54.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

61.

immunity for state health officers); List v. O'Connor, 167 N.E.2d 188, 189-90
(Ill. 1960) (granting immunity for park district employees); Weast v. Budd, 349
P.2d 912 (Kan. 1960) (granting immunity for city managers).
See Maryland-Nat'! Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. Kranz, 308 Md. 618,
521 A.2d 729 (1987) (noting that traditionally the State's immunity was referred
to as "sovereign immunity" while that attached to municipalities was called
governmental immunity, the semantic difference now being insignificant, and the
terms now used interchangeably).
See Heffner v. Montgomery County, 76 Md. App. 328, 332, 545 A.2d 67, 69
(1987).
[d. at 332-33, 545 A.2d at 69.
[d. at 333, 545 A.2d at 69.
/d.

28 U.S.c. §§ 2671-2680 (2000).
See Court of Claims Act, Ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855). The Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 27 (1982) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 171 (1988)) stated that the United States Claims Court was a successor
court to the Court of Claims. The Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992,
Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (codified at 28 U.S.c. § 171 (1994))
changed the name of the Claims Court to the United States Court of Federal
Claims.
See Boger et aI., supra note II, at 508.
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the government liable only on its contracts,62 despite Alexander
Hamilton's pronouncement nearly a century before that "contracts
between a nation and individuals are only binding on the
conscience of the sovereign, and . . . confer no right of action
independent of the sovereign Will.,,63
Until 1946, the only way a citizen could make a claim in tort
against the federal government was to file a private bill in
But by enacting the Federal Tort Claims Act
Congress. 64
(FTCA),65 Congress broadened the liability of the United States,
permitting recovery for the negligent acts of federal employees. 66
The concept underlying the statute is simple: The United States
may be sued and is liable in the same way and to the same extent
as a private individual under the same circumstances, in
accordance with the law of the place in which the negligent or
wrongful conduct by its agent occurred. 67
In March 1974, Congress amended the FTCA 68 in an important
way. The Amendment, in effect, included within the coverage of
the FTCA a group of intentional torts that were previously
excluded. 69 This action has been referred to as the "intentional
torts amendment.,,70 Contemporary events/ 1 and the Supreme
Court ruling in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau 0[ Narcotics,72 created the so-called
"constitutional tort.,,7 The Court ruled that claimants may file
62.
63.

64.

65.

66.
67.

68.

69.
70.
71.

72.
73.

See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 5; Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. 269, 274
(1868) (stating that the government must pay for what it agreed to purchase).
THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 508 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1888).
See Frank Hanley Santoro, A Practical Guide to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 63
CONN. B. J. 224 (1989); Alexander Holtzoff, The Handling of Tort Claims Against
the Federal Government, 9 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311 (1942); Note, Tort
Claims Against the United States, 30 GEO. L. J. 462 (1942).
28 U.S.c. §§ 2671-2680 (2000). For a comprehensive history of the FTCA, the
legislative birth of which began in the 1920's, see generally Note, The Federal
Tort Claims Act. 56 YALE L.J. 534 (1947).
See Boger et aI.. supra note 11, at 508-09.
See ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
SOURCEBOOK 599-632 (2d ed. 1992) (providing an overview of the history of the
Federal Tort Claims Act); see also Krent, supra note 1, at 1546 (stating that the
FTCA is predicated on state law).
28 U.S.c. § 2680(h) (1976), amending 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970); see also
Boger et aI., supra note II, at 498.
See Boger et aI., supra note II, at 498.
ld.
ld. at 498-505 (discussing the actions taken by the federal government in quelling
student riots at Jackson and Kent State Universities in May 1970, the 1971 May
Day mass arrests in Washington, D.C., the prisoner rebellion at Attica State
Prison in September 1971, and an infamous 1973 narcotics raid in Collinsville,
Illinois).
403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that federal law enforcement officers could be sued
under the Constitution itself, notwithstanding sovereign immunity).
Boger et aI., supra note 11, at 510.
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suits alleging such claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which
provides jurisdiction in all cases "arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.,,74
The 1974 Amendment affected § 2680(h) of the FTCA, which
delineates the tort actions for which the United States has not
waived immunity. 75 Under the Amendment, when "investigative
or law enforcement officers of the United States Government,,76
commit one of the excepted torts, suits on this basis are
permitted. 77

In 1988, Congress again modified the FTCA to clarify that it is
the exclusive remedy for common law torts committed by federal
employees within the scope of their employment. 78 This
Amendment was a response to the Supreme Court's decision in
Westfall v. Erwin, 79 a ruling that dramatically expanded the
personal tort liability of federal employees. 8o Through this
Amendment, Congress conferred absolute immunity on all
governmental officials for common law torts committed within the
scope of federal employment. 81
Thus, the FTCA permits a citizen to bring a civil action against
the United States for personal injury or property damage that was
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of a
74.
75.

76.
77.

28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000).
Generally speaking, 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2000) lists the several instances in which
federal tort claims procedures do not apply. Subsection (h), as noted above, lists
tort actions for which the United States has not waived immunity. Prior to the
1974 Amendment, § 2680(h) read as follows: "Any claim arising out of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process,
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights." 28
U.s.c. § 2680(h) (1970).
28 U.S.c. § 2680(h) (1976), amending 28 U.S.c. § 2680(h) (1970).
The 1974 Amendment to § 2680(h) added the following proviso to the existing
text:
Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or
law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the
provisions of this chapter and section 1346 (b) of this title shall apply
to any claim arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this
proviso, out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse
of process, or malicious prosecution.

78.

79.

80.

81.

8 U.S.c. § 2680(h) (1976); see also United States v. Andrews, 441 F.3d 220,
226-27 (4th Cir. 2006) (reviewing the § 2680 definition of "law enforcement
officer," and holding that a Bureau of Prisons officer is not covered by the § 2680
exemption).
See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988
(FELRTCA), Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (codified at 28 U.S.c. § 2679
(1994».
484 U.S. 292 (1988), superseded by statute, Federal Employees Liability Reform
and Tort Compensation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2679 (1994».
[d. at 299.
See Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act
(FELRTCA) § 2, 102 Stat. at 4564.
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government employee, so long as the employee was acting within
the scope of his employment. 82 The employee is immune from
suit. By virtue of the FTCA, the government has effectively
substituted itself as the potential defendant in tort suits. 83
Under the FTCA, the term "federal agency" includes the
"executive departments, the judicial and legislative branches, the
military departments, independent establishments of the United
States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or
agencies of the United States, but does not include any contractor
with the United States.,,84 An "employee of the government"
includes "(1) officers or employees of any federal agency,
members of the military or naval forces of the United States,
members of the National Guard while engaged in training or
duty,,85 under certain sections of Title 32 of the Code, and:
[P]ersons acting on behalf of a federal agency in an
official capacity, temporarily or permanently in the
service of the United States, whether with or
without compensation, and (2) any officer or
employee of a Federal public defender organization,
except when such officer or employee performs
professional services in the course of providing
representation under section 3006A of Title 18 of
the Code. 86
2.

Procedural Requirements of the FTCA

Before filing suit, a claimant must file an administrative claim
to the "appropriate federal agency" within two years of the alleged
injury. 87 The claim must be for a specific compensatory amount
and the claimant should also provide supporting documentation. 88
Many agencies have established rather elaborate procedures for
the presentation, investigation, and administrative disposition of
tort claims, and thousands of claims are settled at the agency
level. 89
82.
83.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

89.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2679.
FELRTCA made the FTCA the exclusive remedy for the common law torts
committed by federal employees in the course of their employment. Previously,
the government was clearly liable under the FTCA but it was unclear whether the
employee was also liable. See DAVIS, supra note 11, at 23.
28 U.S.C. § 2671 (2000).
Id.
Id.
See 28 U.S.c. §§ 2401, 2675(a) (2000).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (2000) (the amount of the claim cannot be increased
after the suit is filed unless new evidence has been discovered in the interim); 28
C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1988) (the claim for money damages must be set forth in a
certain and specific sum).
See generally ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 67 (relating
administrative law and regulatory practices and explanations of the laws broadly
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The agency has a minimum of six months to evaluate the claim
for settlement; if the agency does not respond to the claim within
that timeframe, the claimant may presume a denial and file suit. 90
The complaint must be filed in the United States District Court
within six months of the denial, or the expiration of the denial
period. 91 Venue is proper either in the district in which the alleged
injury occurred or where the plaintiff resides.92 The cause of
action is litigated based on the substantive tort law of the state in
which the alleged wrongful act occurred. 93 Although most of the
cases brought under the FTCA are founded in negligence, suit may
also be brought for other tortious acts. 94
The complaint must name the United States as the defendant,
and the only remedy available is money damages. 95 The FTC A
does not authorize equitable relief, punitive damages or prejudgment interest. 96 The FTCA does not provide for jury trials,97
and attorney's fees are limited to 20 percent of the amount
recovered for an administrative settlement entered into with an
agency and 25 percent of litigation settlements or judgments. 98
As a defendant, the United States has available all tort litigation
defenses that a private party defendant would have under the same
cause of action. 99 The United States may raise a defense of
sovereign immunity in a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff has not

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

applicable to federal agency officials); NAT'L CTR. ON POVERTY LAW, FEDERAL
PRACTICE MANUAL FOR LEGAL AID ATTORNEYS (Jeffrey S. Gutman ed., 2004)
(discussing litigation practices in both state and federal courts); see also Paul G.
Cereghini, Note, Federal Tort Claims Act Administrative Claim Prerequisite.
1983 ARIz. ST. L. 1. 173 (1983) (discussing the interpretation of the minimal
notice requirement); John Sackett, Comment, The Art of Claimsmanship: What
Constitutes Sufficient Notice of a Claim Under the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 52
U. CIN. L. REv. 149 (1983) (discussing the requirements of a proper and sufficient
FTCA claim); Note, Claim Requirement of the Federal Tort Claims Act: Minimal
Notice or Substantial Documentation?, 81 MICH. L. REv. 1641 (1983) (provides
recommendations that promote both the settlement and fairness policies of the
FTCA amendments); Note, Federal Tort Claims Act: Notice of Claim
Requirement, 67 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1982) (examines the notice provision of the
FTCA and its underlying policies).
See 28 U.S.c. § 2675(a) (2000).
See 28 U.S.c. § 2401 (b)(2000).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (2000).
See 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b)(I) (2000).
See 28 U.S.c. § 2680(h) (2000); see also Boger et ai., supra note II, at 517-19.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b) (2000).
See 28 U.S.c. § 2674 (2000).
See 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (2000).
See 28 U.S.c. § 2678 (2000).
See. e.g., Starnes v. United States, 139 F.3d 540, 542 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that
the United States can assert the same defenses available to private citizens);
Palmer v. Flaggman, 93 F.3d 196, 199 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that "the United
States's waiver of sovereign immunity is limited by the same defenses available
to private citizens ... "); Loughlin v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 2d 26, 44
(D.D.C. 2002) (stating that "the United States is liable for tort claims in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances").

20061

Governmental Immunity in Maryland

49

complied with the administrative prerequisites to suit as described
above. 100 In addition, the FTCA contains more than a dozen
exceptions to its waiver of sovereign immunity, such as claims
arising in a foreign country, claims based on the performance of a
discretionary function, and claims covered by certain other
statues. 101 Finally, under the Feres doctrine, 102 the Supreme Court
has held that the FTCA does not cover injuries to military
personnel that occur in the course of military service. 103
Once a complaint is filed, the plaintiff must serve the United
States Attorney in the district under the provisions of Rule
4(i)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any local
district rules. The plaintiff must also send a copy of the complaint
by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General at the
Department of Justice in Washington, D.C. 104 After service, the
suit is litigated in the same manner as any federal civil action.
Although many plaintiffs rely on the FTCA to bring suit against
the United States, practitioners should be aware that there are more
than forty other federal statutes that afford administrative or
judicial remedies for certain additional kinds of losses that result
from government action. These statutes include, for example, the
Copyright Remedy Clarification Act,105 the Military and Foreign
Claims Act,106 and the Public Vessels Act. 107 Each of these Acts
sets out different kinds of available claims, covered claimants,
remedies available, proof required, and administrative procedures.
Discussion of these other waivers of sovereign immunity is beyond
the scope of this Article, but there are other comprehensive
resources available to the practitioner. 108

100.
101.

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See 28 U.S.c. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a) (2000).
See 28 U.S.c. § 2680 (2000).
See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
Id. at 146.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(B).
See 17 U.S.c. § 511 (2000).
See 10 U.S.c. §§ 2731-2739 (2000).
See 46 U.S.C. § 781 (2000).
See, e.g., GEORGE A. BERMANN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
ADMINISTRATIVE HANDLING OF MONETARY CLAIMS: TORT CLAIMS AT THE
AGENCY LEVEL (1984) (focusing on agency handling of tort and tort-like claims
and the procedures by which the agencies exercise authority to entertain the
claims); LESTER S. JAYSON & ROBERT C. LONGSTRETH, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT
CLAIMS §§ 1.01-1.21 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2006) (providing a comprehensive
discussion of all compensatory remedies available against the government).
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B.

Maryland Has Waived Its Common Law Sovereign Immunity
Through the Maryland Tort Claims Act

1.

History of the Maryland Tort Claims Act

The Maryland Tort Claims Act (MTCA)I09 is the sole method
for suing the State of Maryland and its personnel in tort; it is a
limited waiver of sovereign or governmental immunity.llo Under
the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, the State and its
agencies or units may be sued only with "specific legislative
consent" III for the type of suit in question. I12 Under Maryland
law, even where a statute specifically waives immunity, a suit may
only be brought where there are "funds available for the
satisfaction of the judgment" or the agency has been given the
power "for the raising of funds necessary to satisfy a recovery
against it." 113
The MTCA provides a remedy for citizens who are injured by
the negligent acts or omissions of state personnel acting within the
scope of their public duties. 114 This limited waiver of sovereign
immunity was the result of a compromise by the Maryland
Legislature in balancing conflicting interests: an interest in
providing a remedy to injured persons while protecting the State's
fiscal reserves, and an interest in protecting state personnel from
suit. 115
When the General Assembly first waived sovereign immunity
on July 1, 1982, it created a waiver of the immunity for the State,
for its units, and for state personnel, who are acting in official
capacities as to six specified tort actions. 116 Thus, the General
Assembly waived the sovereign immunity of the State in tort to a
limited extent: for only six specific torts and only to the extent and
109.
110.
111.

112.
1l3.

114.
115.

116.

MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 12-101 to 12-110 (2004).
See infra notes 111-1l3.
See Oep't of Natural Res. v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 58-59, 521 A.2d 313, 315
(1986).
Id.; see also Katz v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. 503, 507-08,
397 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1979).
See Univ. of Md. v. Maas, 173 Md. 554, 559, 197 A.2d 123, 125 (1938); see also
Bd. of Trs. of Howard Cmty. Coil. v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 590-91,
366 A.2d 360, 366 (1976).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOv'T § 12-104; see also MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 5-522 (2002).
See REpORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO STUDY THE LIABILITY OF PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES ( 1978) (considering various issues relating to the issues surrounding
the protection of public employees from potential and actual liability ); REPORT OF
THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION TO STUDY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1976)
(discussing the fiscal impacts of sovereign immunity).
See 1981 Md. Laws 1609; Kee v. State Highway Admin., 313 Md. 445, 448-49,
545 A.2d 1312, 1314 (1988); State v. Card, 104 Md. App. 439, 446, 656 A.2d
400,404 (1995); Foor v. Juvenile Servs. Admin., 78 Md. App. 151, 106-63,552
A.2d 947, 951-53 (1989).
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amount of insurance coverage. 117 Although the state employee
who allegedly caused the harm could be sued, joinder of the State
as a defendant was required if the plaintiff alleged that there was a
"tortious act or omission that is within the scope" of the
employee's public duties. I IS
In 1984, the General Assembly restructured the MTCA, adding
a seventh specific tort. 119 And in 1985, it expanded the Act
waiving state immunity "as to a tort action," generally.120 But it
was not until 2003 that the Court of Appeals determined that this
language included "constitutional torts" arising from alleged
violations of the state constitution.121 The 1985 Amendments also
excluded from the waiver of immunity "acts and omissions
committed [by state personnel] with malice or gross negligence,"
and designated that the entire Act be recodified in the State
Government Article. 122
Although the State waived its immunity more broadly, it did not
waive its immunity for punitive damages; for interest before
judgment; for claims arising from the combatant activities of the
militia during a state of emergency; for acts or omissions not
within the scope of the public duties of the personnel; or for acts or
omissions that are committed with malice or gross negligence. 123
Additionally, the State's immunity is waived only for
compensatory damages up to a maximum of $200,000 for each
claimant for mJuries ansmg from a single incident or
occurrence. 124 In addition, before a claimant may file suit against
the State, he must comply with certain notification procedures. 125
117.

118.
119.

120.

121.

122.
123.

124.
125.

See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-403 (1984); Kee, 313 Md. at 455, 545
A.2d at 1314; see also Ruff, 278 Md. at 590,366 A.2d at 366 (holding that even
with a waiver of sovereign immunity, an action for a money judgment may not be
maintained unless funds have been appropriated for that purpose).
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(b); Simpson v. Moore, 323 Md.
215,218,592 A.2d 1090,1091 (1991).
See 1984 Md. Laws 1419-20 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-104
(1984)).
See 1985 Md. Laws 2683 (codified at MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-104(a)
(2004)); see also Simpson, 323 Md. at 219, 592 A.2d at 1092; Clea v. City
Council of Baltimore, 312 Md. 662, 671 n.6, 541 A.2d 1303, 1307 n.6 (1988);
Foor, 78 Md. App. at 161,552 A.2d at 952 (1989).
See Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 266, 863 A.2d 297,310 (2004) (holding that the
"immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act ... encompasses constitutional
torts and intentional torts").
See Md. State Highway Admin. v. Kim, 353 Md. 313, 320-21, 726 A.2d 238, 242
(1999); Simpson, 323 Md. at 218, 592 A.2d at 1091.
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 12-104(b), 12-105; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 5-522(a)(l)-(4).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-104(a) (1)-(2); MD CODE ANN., CTS. &
JUD. PROC. § 5-522(a)(5); MD. CODE REGS. 25.02.02.02D( I) (1984).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-106(b) (2004); see also Simpson, 323
Md. at 230-31, 592 A.2d at 1097 (1991 ) (discussing the procedural requirements
for maintaining a claim against the State).
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Immunity of State Personnel

:'he (~eneral Assembly enacted important amendments to the
M?\~A in 1990 concerning the immunity of state personnel. I26
~::<.'ljle the State waived its sovereign immunity for torts, it
};iep.~rved it for state employees, substituting the state government
a3 the responsible party for torts committed by individual
employees in certain circumstances. 127 State employees and others
designated as "State personnel,,128 are immune from suit in courts
of the State l29 and from liability in tort for tortious acts or
omissions committed within the scope of their public duties, so
long as the acts are made without malice or gross negligence. 130 In
essence, state employees continue to enjoy a form of sovereign
immunity, and the State has waived its own immunity on their
behalf. Accordingly, tort suits must name the State of Maryland as
defendant, and not an individual employee.
The statutory immunity provided by the MTCA is qualified and
if a complainant alleges with specific facts that an employee acted
with malice or gross negligence, a plaintiff may be able to defeat
the state employee's immunity. 131 This type of suit must be
126.
127.

128.

129.

130.
131.

1990 Md. Laws 2271 (expanding the definition of "State personnel").
See Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 261-62, 863 A.2d 297, 307 (2004) (stating that
the "Maryland Tort Claims Act ... generally waives sovereign or governmental
immunity and substitutes the liability of the State for the liability of the state
employee committing the tort.").
Generally, members of state boards and commissions are protected under the
MTCA from personal liability for damages and expenses arising out of their
service absent a finding of gross negligence or willful misconduct. See MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §§ 12-101 (a)(3)(i), 12-105 (2004); MD. CODE ANN.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(b). For that reason, the State Treasurer has not
purchased additional coverage except, and to the extent that, the MTCA does not
cover a potential claim. An example of such a claim would be a claim of
securities fraud under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. If the Treasurer
did elect to purchase commercial coverage for an agency, the policy limits, terms
and conditions of the commercial coverage will determine exposure and establish
the limit of liability. MD. CODE REGS. 25.02.02.01(B) (1984).
Despite that the statute seems to limit the immunity of state personnel "from suit
in the courts of the State," under MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522 (b),
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland has routinely applied
the Act to its cases. See, e.g., Maidy v. Guerzon, No. JFM-01-104, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 10559, at *20 (D. Md. July 23, 2001) (plaintiff cannot maintain a
negligence action against state employee in federal court "because Maryland
would pay the judgment"); White v. Md. Transp. Auth., 151 F. Supp. 2d 651, 657
(D. Md. 2001). But see Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 397 (4th
,Cir. 1990); Johnson v. Baltimore City Police Dep't, 757 F. Supp. 677, 678 (D.
Md. 1991).
See MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(a)(4).
See Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 163, 725 A.2d 549, 559-60 (1999)
(holding that unless plaintiff establishes actual malice or gross negligence, the
state employee is immune); Ford v. Baltimore City Sheriffs Office, 149 Md.
App. 107, 120,814 A.2d 127, 134 (2002) (holding that MTCA "clearly provides"
that a state employee acting within their scope of employment, and without
malice or gross negligence, is immune from suit).
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brought against the employee personally because the State retains
its sovereign immunity as to that cause of action. Compensatory
and punitive damages may be awarded only against the employee,
and the MTCA damages limitation of $200,000 does not apply. 132
Under the MTCA, the phrase "scope of public duties" is
equivalent to the common law concept of "scope of
employment"-that is, whether the employee's acts were
authorized by the employer and were in furtherance of the
employer's business. 133 If the employee's conduct was based on
personal intentions, was outrageous or unauthorized, or at a time
not usually considered a work period, the conduct may be beyond
the scope of employment. 134
"Malice" under the MTCA refers to the subjective state of mind
of the tortfeasor 135 and is something beyond the merely reckless or
wanton conduct that is associated with gross negligence. Under
Maryland law, "malice" is defined as "an act without legal
justification or excuse, but with an evil or rancorous motive
influenced by hate, the purpose being to deliberately and willfully
injure the plaintiff." 136 The plaintiff s proof of malice "must point
to specific evidence that raises an inference that the defendant's
actions were improperly motivated . . . sufficient to support a
reasonable inference of ill will or improper motive.,,137 Generally,
conclusory allegations will not satisfy this burden of proof. 138
"Gross negligence" carries a similarly high standard of proof,
being defined as "an intentional failure to perform a manifest duty
in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or
property of another.,,139 Proof of gross negligence requires a
showing of intentional "wanton or reckless disregard for human
132.

133.
134.
135.
136.

137.
138.

139.

See Catterton v. Coale, 84 Md. App. 337,442-45,579 A.2d 781, 783-84 (1990)
cert. denied, 321 Md. 638, 584 A.2d 67 (1991) (holding that a social worker
acted with a dishonest purpose and therefore was not entitled to statutory
immunity); Shoemaker, 353 Md. at 158, 725 A.2d at 557 (stating that the state
immunity in tort actions is not waived for personnel acting outside the scope of
their public duties or for actions made with malice or gross negligence).
See Sawyer v. Humphries, 322 Md. 247, 253-54, 587 A.2d 467, 470 (1991).
Id. at 255-56; see also MD. CODE REGs. 25.02.02.02 (1984).
See Thacker v. City of Hyattsville, 135 Md. App. 268, 300-01, 762 A.2d 172,
189-90 (2000).
See Shoemaker, 353 Md. at 163, 725 A.2d at 560 (quoting Leese v. Baltimore
County, 64 Md. App. 442,480,497 A.2d 159, 179 (1985»; Sawyer, 322 Md. at
261, 587 A.2d at 474; see also Wells v. State, 100 Md. App. 693, 705,42 A.2d
879,885 (1994); Catterton, 84 Md. at 342-44,579 A.2d at 783-84.
Thacker, 135 Md. App. at 301, 762 A.2d at 189-90.
See Foor v. Juvenile Servs. Admin., 78 Md. App. 151, 170, 552 A.2d 947, 956
(1989); Elliott v. Kupferman, 58 Md. App. 510,528,473 A.2d 960, 969 (1984)
(requiring clear and precise facts of malice to defeat immunity).
Marriott Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 124 Md. App. 463, 478, 723
A.2d 454,462 (1998) (quoting Romanesk v. Rose, 248 Md. 420, 423, 237 A.2d
12, 14 (1968».
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life or the rights of others.,,140 Accordingly, whether a state
employee is deprived of his or her statutory immunity is evaluated
from a subjective perspective, as it is the individual's personal
intentions that define whether he or she acted with malice or gross
negligence.
3.

Procedural Preconditions to Suit Under the MTCA

As with the FTCA, the MTCA imposes another limitation on
Maryland's waiver of sovereign immunity by requiring an
administrative process as a prerequisite to filing suit. The MTCA
establishes a comprehensive scheme setting forth specific
procedural requirements that are preconditions to filing a suit
against the State. 141 If a plaintiff fails to fulfill these conditions,
sovereign immunity is not waived and a court is without
jurisdiction to hear the case. 142
The MTCA sets forth as the primary precondition to suit against
the State a notice provision: "A claimant may not institute an
action under this subtitle unless: (1) the claimant submits a written
claim to the Treasurer or a designee of the Treasurer within 1 year
after the injury to person or property that is the basis of the claim .
. . .,,143 The "discovery rule" that may be used to extend statutes of
limitation in civil cases does not apply to this notice requirement,
and the Court of Appeals has refused to recognize any "good
cause" exception to the notice requirement. 144
The State Treasurer must deny the claim before suit may be
filed. 145 A "final denial" is either when "(1) ... the Treasurer or
designee sends the claimant, or the legal representative or counsel
for the claimant written notice of denial; or (2) if the Treasurer or
designee fails to give notice of a final decision within 6 months
after the filing of the claim.,,146 The MTCA's statute of limitations
is the same as the standard under state law and requires that a
claimant file suit within three years after the cause of action
arises. 147
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

145.

146.
147.

See Foor, 78 Md. App. at 169-70; Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 579-80, 594 A.2d
121,131-32 (1991).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-106(b)(1)-(3) (2004); see also Simpson
v. Moore, 323 Md. 215, 230-31, 592 A.2d 1090, 1097 (1991).
See Simpson, 323 Md. at 230-31,592 A.2d at 1097.
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-106(b).
See Simpson, 323 Md. at 224-25, 592 A.2d at 1094; see also Trimper v. PorterHayden, 305 Md. 31, 52, 501 A.2d 446,457 (1985); Cotham v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, 260 Md. 556, 565, 273 A.2d 115, 120 (1971).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-106(b)(2); Gardner v. State, 77 Md. App.
237, 244, 549 A.2d 1171, 1175 (I988) (denial of the claim by the Treasurer is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to filing suit).
MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-107(d)(I)-(2) (2004).
See § 12-106(b)(3).
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The claim must be in writing and state generally the basis of the
claim. 148 It should contain a statement of the underlying facts,
including the date and place of the alleged tort, make a specific
demand for damages, give the name and address of the potential
parties and their counsel, and be signed by the claimant, counselor
other legal representative. 149 "Substantial compliance" with the
requirement of § 12-107 is sufficient to satisfy the notice
requirement with respect to the content of the notice,150 but notice
to the agency or to the Attorney General is not sufficient,
substantial compliance with the notice requirements, regardless of
its contents. 151
This advance notice allows the State Treasurer to investigate the
merits of the claim, to determine whether it is covered by a
commercial policy or is a self-insured loss, to consult with the
Attorney General for a determination whether the Attorney
General should represent the employee and/or defend the State,
and to determine whether a claim should be settled and how much
should be offered in settlement. 152 These procedural requirements
allow the State Treasurer's Office a reasonable opportunity for an
orderly consideration of the thousands of tort claims filed annually
against the State. 153
Once the Treasurer denies a claim, or it is deemed to have been
denied,154 the claimant may file suit in the appropriate Maryland
state court. The plaintiff must serve the suit on the Treasurer,
although the Attorney General of Maryland will defend the action
on behalf of the State and any of its units. 155
4.

The State's Insurance Program

Currently, and with only a few discreet exceptions, the State is
self-insured for liability in tort. Specifically, the Treasurer has
148.
149.
150.

151.
152.

153.

154.

155.

See § 12-106(b)(I).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-107(a).
See Conaway v. State, 90 Md. App. 234, 242, 600 A.2d 1133, 1136-37 (1992).
However, the doctrine of substantial compliance does not apply when no claim
has been filed. See Johnson v. Md. State Police, 331 Md. 285,297-98, 628 A.2d
162, 168 (1993).
See MD. CODE REGS. 25.02.03.01-03 (2001).
See Chinwuba v. Larsen, 142 Md. App. 327, 355-57, 790 A.2d 83, 98-100
(2002), cert. granted, 369 Md. 179, 798 A.2d 551 (2002), rev'd on other
grounds, 377 Md. 92, 832 A.2d 193 (2003).
See Johnson 331 Md. at 294-96, 628 A.2d at 166-67. The Treasurer reports that
the Insurance Division investigates and adjusts approximately 3,800 claims per
year.
See
State
of
Maryland
Treasurer's
Office,
http://www.treasurer.state.md.us/insurance.htm (last visited December 30,2006).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-107(d)(2) (a claim is "finally denied" if
Treasurer fails to give notice of a final decision within six months of the filing of
a claim).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-108(2004).
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been charged with providing sufficient self-insurance "to cover the
liability of the State and its units and personnel under the Maryland
Tort Claims Act." 156 The State's tort liability under the MTCA is
limited to $200,000 per claimant, and the Treasurer's regulations
provide that the State's limit of liability is currently set at
"$200,000 per claimant for all injury, loss, and damage to person
and property arising from a single incident.,,157 The regulations
also provide that "[t]he sovereign immunity of the State is not
waived for claims in excess of the limits .... ,,158 Moreover, the
Court of Appeals has explained that "a legislative waiver of
sovereign immunity is ineffective unless specific legislative
authority to sue the agency has been given, and unless there are
funds available for the satisfaction of the judgment .... ,,159
The Treasurer is permitted to purchase commercial
.msurance, 160 an d d
' speCla
. Ity coverage, suc h as
oes so e
lor certam
aviation hull, rail car, boiler and large machinery, and port
coverage. Claims relating to these specialty areas are filed with the
Insurance Division, but adjusted and insured by the commercial
coverage. 161
The vast majority of the State's liability risks are covered by the
State Insurance Trust Fund (SITF).162 Under the SITF, the
Treasurer categorizes claims into four basic categories. Noncatastrophic claims that are related to real and personal property
loss from fire, vandalism, storm damage, and the like, are adjusted
by the Insurance Division of the State Treasurer's Office, and are
covered by the self-insurance previously mentioned. 163 The srTF
also covers claims for officers' and employees' liability, including
awards made through the Board of Public Works l64 for such
settlements or judgments against state employees or officials for

IS6.
IS7.
IS8.
IS9.
160.

161.

162.

163.

164.

[d. § 9-lOS( c).
MD. CODE REGS. 2S.02.02.02(D)(l) (2001); see also MD. CODE ANN., STATE
GOy'T § 12-104(a)(2) (2004).
MD. CODE REGS. 2S.02.02.02(E).
Katz v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 284 Md. S03, S12, 397 A.2d 1027,
1032 (1979) (emphasis added).
MD. CODE REGS. 2S.02.02.01(A) (2001).
See MD. CODE REGS. 2S.02.06.01-01 (2001); State of Maryland Treasurer's
Office, http://www.treasurer.state.md.us/insurance.htm (last visited December 30,
2006).
The University System of Maryland has independent authority to purchase
insurance, MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 12-104(i)(2) (2004); the Mass Transit
Administration is self-insured for torts committed by its personnel. MD. CODE
ANN., TRANSP. § 7-702(a)-(b) (2001).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 9-10S (2006); see also State of Md.
Treasurer's Office, http://www.treasurer.state.md.us/insurance.htm (last visited
Dec. 30, 2006).
MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 9-lOS(a)(l)(iv); see also MD. CODE ANN.,
~TATE GOy'T § 12-S01(a)(I) (2004).
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actions brought under federal statutes, for which the employees or
officials do not enjoy state statutory immunity. 165
General tort claims are the third category of risk handled by the
Insurance Division and include premises liability, professional
liability, and other claims arising from services provided by the
State. 166 Finally, the Treasurer also self-insures for motor vehicle
comprehensive and liability coverage, which includes both tort
claims arising from the operation of motor vehicles by state
personnel and claims for repair or replacement of state vehicles
damaged in automobile accidents. 167
In every budget bill since the enactment of the MTCA, the
General Assembly and the Governor have deposited funds into the
SITF for the State's self-insurance reserve. 168 The SITF is
comprised of general fund and special fund appropriations in the
state budget to the Treasurer, and state agencies pay annual
premiums to the SITF and make reimbursements for losses paid
out of the SITF. 169
The Treasurer is responsible for maintaining the solvency of the
SITF and with setting agency premiums "so as to produce funds
that approximate the payments from the Fund.,,170 Each state
agency has an annual $1,000 deductible for each loss paid from the
SITF,which is paid from appropriations in the agency's budget. 171
5.

Discretionary Payment Provision

The MTCA allows the Treasurer to make discretionary
payments from the SITF in excess of $200,000 when a judgment or
165.

166.

167.
168.
169.

170.
171.

See State v. Card, 104 Md. App. 439, 444-45, 656 A.2d 400, 403 (1995) (stating
that federal civil rights lawsuits are outside the scope of the Act and that the
counties must pay the insurance costs and reimburse the State for any judgments
paid out).
See MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 9-105(c) (2006); see also State of
Maryland Treasurer's Office, http://www.treasurer.state.md.us/insurance.htm
(last visited Dec. 30, 2006).
See
State
of
Maryland
Treasurer's
Office,
http://www.treasurer.state.md.us/insurance.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2006).
See, e.g., S.B. 110,2006 Leg., 421st Sess. (Md. 2006) (appropriating $8 million
to agency budgets for tort claims).
MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 9-103(b)(2). On a yearly basis, the
Treasurer's actuaries assess the SITF's reserves and each agency's loss for
property damage, tort claims and constitutional claims. The actuaries and the
Insurance Divisions calculate a per capital rate for each person and vehicle
assigned to each agency, which includes administrative expenses of the Insurance
Division. The Agency's loss history incurred since the previous budget cycle is
added to the baseline rate and the losses are amortized over a five year period to
compute the Agency's annual premium. See State of Maryland Treasurer's
Office, http://www.treasurer.state.md.us/insurance.htm (last visited December 30,
2006).
MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. &PROC. § 9-106(b).
[d. § 9-107(c).
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settlement has been entered granting a claimant damages in excess
of the statutory maximum if the Board of Public Works has
approved the supplement. 172 While the discretionary payment
provision appears to provide broad authority for the Attorney
General or the Treasurer to recommend to the Board of Public
Works that it approve payments in excess of the limitation, in
practical terms it does not. First, budget bills since 1987 have
included restrictions that limit the Treasurer's abili~ to settle and
pay a tort judgment above the maximum amount. 17 Second, the
Treasurer's own regulation allows her to make a recommendation
to the Board of Public Works only if the initial settlement or
judgment is paid from the commercial insurance and in the amount
of the commercial insurance limits. 174 Because nearly all claims
against the State are covered by the SITF, almost none of the
potentially excessive claims would meet these requirements.
6.

Multiple Claimants from Single Incident or Occurrence

The MTCA strictly limits the State's liability for tort claims
filed against the State, not to "exceed $200,000 to a single claimant
for injuries arising from a single incident or occurrence,,,175 and
the State's sovereign immunity is only waived up to that monetary
limit. 176 The Treasurer's regulations further provide that all
persons claiming damages resulting from bodily injury to, or the
death of, any person shall be considered as one claimant. 177
The most common challenge to the single limitation provision
arises in wrongful death or survival actions where there are often
several statutory beneficiaries seeking recovery. 178 Although there
has been no appellate decision on the issue, the regulation should
survive any challenge that the provision is in derogation of the
waiver of sovereign immunity under the MTCA. 179 There are three
primary reasons why the single cap recovery for wrongful death or
survival actions is appropriate.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

177.

178.
179.

See MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOy'T § 12-104(c)(1)(i)-(iii).
See, e.g., S.B. 110,2006 Leg., 421st Sess. (Md. 2006).
MD. CODE REGS. 25.02.02.03 (1984).
MD. CODE ANN, STATE GOy'T § 12-104(a)(2) (2004).
/d.; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(a)(5) (2002); MD. CODE REGS.
25.02.02.E (1984); Gooslin v. State, 132 Md. App. 290, 295, 752 A.2d 642,644
(2000) (holding that MTCA limitations on damages is not an unconstitutional
restriction on the rights of injured persons to recover fair compensation).
MD. CODE REGS. 25.02.02.02 D(1)(a). In addition, damage to, or destruction of, a
single item of property s:,all be considered to be one claimant. MD. CODE REGS.
25.02.02.02 D(1)(b).
MD CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 3-904 (2002).
Interview with Laura C. McWeeney, Assistant Attorney General, Deputy Counsel
to the State Treasurer (2003).
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First, the statute, the regulations, and the State's insurance
coverage clearly limit the State's liability under the MTCA, based
on the occurrence of bodily injury and not upon the number of
claimants claiming derivative damages from that injury.180 This
view is consistent with the Court of Appeals' interpretation of
analogous commercial insurance bodily injury provisions. 181
Second, the regulations were enacted pursuant to the broad
authority granted to the Treasurer by the General Assembly, and
are consistent with the spirit of the law and do not contradict its
statutory language or purpose; therefore, the regulations are
presumptively valid. 182
Third, and most importantly, every year since the passage of the
MTCA in 1982, the General Assembly and the Governor have
enacted a budget bill appropriating money from the State's selfinsurance reserves into the SITF. Every state budget enactment
from 1982 to the present has adopted the single damages limitation
The language of each budget bill
or occurrence limit. 183
specifically states that payment of settlements and judgments under
the MTCA must be made in accordance with the Treasurer's
regulations. 184 The annual budget bill enactments provide that the
monies appropriated by the General Assembly to the SITF are the
only funds available to make payments under the MTCA.
Accordingly, recovery in excess of $200,000 from the SITF or
execution against other state assets for recovery, even by multiple
claimants, is inappropriate. 185
7.

Miscellaneous Issues of Interest

A state employee who is named as a defendant will, in most
cases, raise in a pre-trial motion, the defense of statutory immunity
described above. If a court denies that claim, the employee may
not immediately appeal the order denying the sovereign immunity
defense, because it is a defense only from liability and not
necessarily from suit. 186 Such an order is not a final judgment on
180.
181.

182.

183.
184.
185.

186.

MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-104 (2004).
See Surratt v. Prince George's County, 320 Md. 439, 452, 578 A.2d 745, 751
(1990) (only one bodily injury suffered); Daley v. U.S. Auto. Ass'n, 312 Md.
550, 553-54, 541 A.2d 632, 633 (1988); see also Igwilo v. Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Guar. Corp., 13 I Md. App. 629, 638, 750 A.2d 646, 651 (2000).
See Lussier v. Md. Racing Comm'n, 343 Md. 681, 687, 684 A.2d 804, 806
(1996) (citing Christ v. Dep't of Natural Res., 335 Md. 427, 437, 644 A.2d 34, 38
(1994)).
See. e.g., S.B. 110,2006 Leg., 421st Sess. (Md. 2006).
Id.
See Bd. of Trs. of Howard Cmty. Coil. v. John K. Ruff Inc., 278 Md. 580, 590,
366 A.2d 360, 366 (1976).
Compare this to the immunity from suit and liability that is provided by the
qualified immunity recognized by federal law. See infra Part II(G).
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the merits of the litigation and, therefore, the collateral order
doctrine does not apply to allow for interlocutory appeal. 187
However, if the state employee-defendant claims absolute, as
opposed to qualified, immunity as defined by the MTCA, a denial
of that defense may be immediately appealed. 188
The State may also seek other bases for dismissal or summary
judgment early on in MTCA litigation, such as noting defects in
the original claim notice, whether the claim has been finally
denied, if the demand for damages exceeds $200,000, and whether
the property involved belongs to the State. The State may assert
these defenses, in addition to those provided by the Maryland
Rules, which, of course, are available to the State. 189 Moreover,
the "State's agencies may not waive sovereign immunity, either
affirmatively or by failing to plead it" as a defense,190 and the State
may raise the defense for the first time on appeal. 191
When the State of Maryland or its employees are sued in
another state, the protections of the MTCA do not apply. Thus, the
State's liability is potentially unlimited and state employees do not
enjoy statutory immunity. While the State of Maryland may argue
that the comity doctrine l92 allows for another state to recognize
and apply the MCT A in its courts, the other state has no obligation
to do so. The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States
Constitution 193 does not require that a state recognize another
state's laws granting itself and its agencies immunity from suit. 194
However, the United States Supreme Court has noted that "[i]t
may be wise policy, as a matter of harmonious interstate relations,
for States to award each other immunity or to respect any
established limits on liability. They are free to do so." 195
Finally, attorneys who bring claims or cases against the State of
Maryland pursuant to the MTCA "may not charge or receive
187.
188.

189.
190.

191.
192.

193.
194.
195.

Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 169-70, 725 A.2d 549, 562-63 (1999);
Maryland v. Jett, 316 Md. 248, 251, 558 A.2d 385,386 (1989).
Rice v. Dunn, 81 Md. App. 510, 513, 568 A.2d 1125, 1127 (1990) (reversing a
Circuit Court's ruling denying appellant's motion for summary judgment based
upon absolute immunity).
See, e.g., MD. R. CIv. P. 2-322.
Dep't of Natural Res. v. Welsh, 308 Md. 54, 60, 521 A.2d 313, 315 (1986) (citing
Bd. ofTrs. of Howard Cmty. Coli., 278 Md. at 584, 366 A.2d at 362-63 (1976».
Foor v. Juvenile Servs. Admin., 78 Md. App. 151, 160, 552 A.2d 947, 951
(1989).
"Comity" is viewed as deference to another state's law where the situation
involves an important matter of public policy and its application is not
"obnoxious" to the forum state. Pac. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306
U.S. 493, 502-04 (1939).
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
Kent County. v. Shepherd, 713 A.2d 290, 296-97 (Del. 1998) (demonstrating the
Court's refusal to apply MTCA to case in which injury occurred in Delaware).
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426 (1979).
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fees" 196 in excess of 20 percent of a settlement or 25 percent of a
judgment obtained. 197
C.

The State ofMaryland Has Not Waived Its Eleventh
Amendment Immunity

The State of Maryland is immune from suit in federal court by
virtue of the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution, unless the State has waived the immunity or
Congress has overridden the immunity. 198 The Supreme Court has
held that "the Constitution does not provide for federal jurisdiction
over suits against nonconsenting States.,,199 In other words, a state
generally cannot be sued in federal court without first .giving
consent to the suit.
However, Congress does have the power to abrogate a state's
immunity based on its powers found in the United States
Constitution, including, without limitation: the Commerce Clause
of Article I and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2oo
Congress did so, for example, when enacting remedial statutes
such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 201 and the
Americans with Disabilities Act. 202
When the Eleventh Amendment applies, states are immune
regardless of the type of relief that is sought, be it monetary,
injunctive or declaratory.203 The State of Maryland's waiver of
immunity in its own courts through the MTCA is not a waiver of
Eleventh Amendment immunity in the federal courts. 204 Indeed,
"only where stated 'by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implication ... as [to] leave no room for any other
construction,,,205 may a court find that a state has waived its
sovereign immunity.206 A state's immunity may be waived when
the state elects to subject itself to the authority of the federal court
by appearing "in a judicial proceeding for the purpose of inducing
196.
197.
198.
199.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

205.
206.

MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-109 (2004).
!d.
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,99 (1984).
Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003) (finding that
Congress validly abrogated state immunity in passing the Family and Medical
Leave Act).
Id. at 726-27.
29 U.S.c. § 621 (2000).
42 U.S.c. § 12101 (2000).
Cory v. White. 457 U.S. 85,91 (1982).
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,239-41 (1985); Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984); Weller v. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 397-98 (4th Cir. 1990).
Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 239-40 (quoting Edelman v. Jordan 415 U.S. 651, 673
(1974)).
Id.
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the court to act or refrain from acting.,,207 For example, in Moreno
v. University of Maryland,208 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit found that a Maryland state agency waived its
immunity by obtaining from the federal court a stay of an
injunction and represented to the court that it would comply with
the relief ordered if it lost its appeal of the injunction. 209
Additionally, if the State of Maryland files a counterclaim to a
federal suit, that action may be construed as a waiver of
immunity.2lo However, the Fourth Circuit has also held that a
State Assistant Attorney General does not have the authority to
consent to a suit in federal court which would otherwise be barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. 211 Lastly, because of the Eleventh
Amendment, the State of Maryland cannot be held liable for the
alleged unconstitutional acts of its employees under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 cases brought in federal COurt. 212

D.

The Local Government Tort Claims Act Does Not Waive the
Governmental Immunity of Local Entities

Tort claims and lawsuits brought against local governments are
regulated by the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA).213
Unlike the MTCA, the LGTCA does not waive sovereign
immunity and, in fact, "has nothing to do with waiver of sovereign
immunity.,,214 Local governments have retained governmental
immunity for the exercise of governmental functions,215 as IS
further explained below.
The LGTCA defines "local governments" in broad terms to
include counties, municipalities and miscellaneous governmental
entities such as the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission,
the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commissions,
public libraries, community colleges, and others. 216 However,
207.
208.
209.
210.

211.
212.

213.

214.
215.
216.

Vargas v. Trainor, 508 F.2d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 1974).
645 F.2d 217 (4th Cir. 1981), ajJ'd sub nom., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. I (1982).
Moreno, 645 F.2d at 220-21.
See Sue & Sam Mfg. Co. v. B-L-S Constr. Co., 538 F.2d 1048, 1051-53 (4th Cir.
1976) (providing an analysis of factors to consider in determining immunity
question).
Linkenhoker v. Weinberger, 529 F.2d 51, 54 (4th Cir. 1975).
Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 332 (1979). States are also not "persons" that are
covered by the statute subjecting § 1983 cases filed in state court against the State
subject to dismissal on that basis. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-30 I (2002) (enacted by 1987 Laws of
Maryland, Ch. 594); see Hous. Auth. of Baltimore City v. Bennett, 359 Md. 356,
357-58,754 A.2d 367, 367-68 (2000).
Williams v. Montgomery County, 123 Md. App. 119, 129,716 A.2d 1100, 1105
(1998), ajJ'd sub nom., Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. 379, 754 A.2d 379 (2000).
Pavelka v. Carter, 996 F.2d 645, 650 (4th Cir. 1993).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-301(d) (2002).
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County Sheriffs are not part of "local government;" they are state
officials,217 protected by the MTCA. . Likewise, the Baltimore
Police Department is a state agency,218 not a local agency, and
claims against it must be made in compliance with the MTCA.
Under the LGTCA, the local government serves as an insurer
that is required to defend and indemnify its employees for torts
they commit within the scope of their employment, even though
the local government, itself, cannot be held liable. 219 Sovereign
immunity then protects the governmental body from liability,
while the LGTCA protects the empl06'ees of local governments
from paying most adverse judgments. 22 The LGTCA requires the
local government to defend employees and requires the local
governments to pay all judgments and settlements, unless the
employee acted with malice or gross negligence. 221 The LGTCA
does not waive the governmental immunity of the local
government; 222 thus, the LGTCA does not create liability on the
part of the local government, but does create financial
responsibili% for the government for the non-malicious acts of its
employees.2 3
Accordingly, a plaintiff must sue an employee and not the
governmental entity, but after prevailing in suit, the plaintiff must
execute any judgment obtained against the local government. 224 A
suit that names only the governmental entity is defective and
subject to a motion to dismiss; one may not sue the local
217.

218.
219.
220.

221.
222.

223.
224.

Rucker v. Harford County, 316 Md. 275,297,558 A.2d 399, 409-10 (1989); MD.
CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 12-101(a)(6) (2004) (defining "a sheriff or deputy
sheriff of a county or Baltimore City" as "State personnel"). However, under
MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 9-108 (2006), a county or Baltimore City
"may obtain insurance to provide the coverage and defense necessary under the
Maryland Tort Claims Act" for "any sheriff or deputy sheriff' engaged in "law
enforcement" or "detention center" functions. Accordingly, in counties in which
such insurance has been obtained by the county, often the County Attorney
defends the sheriff or deputy sheriff, rather than the Attorney General, who would
typically defend state personnel. Additionally, if a judgment is entered, the
county may pay the judgment from its own insurance coverage rather than from
the State's Insurance Trust Fund. MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC. § 9-105
(2006).
Clark v. O'Malley, 169 Md. App. 408,436,901 A.2d 279, 295 (2006).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-302 (2002).
Note that the LGTCA only protects the employee from judgments and not from
liability. See id.
[d.
Williams v. Prince George's County, 157 F. Supp. 2d 596, 603 (D. Md. 2001);
Dawson v. Prince George's County, 896 F. Supp. 537, 539 (D. Md. 1995);
Williams v. Prince George's County, 112 Md. App. 526, 552-53, 685 A.2d 884,
897 -98 (1996).
Dawson, 896 F. Supp. at 539; Khawaja v. City of Rockville. 89 Md. App. 314,
325-26,598 A.2d 489, 494 (1991).
Martino v. Bell, 40 F. Supp. 2d 719, 722 (D. Md. 1999); Ennis v. Crenca, 322
Md. 285, 291-92,587 A.2d 485, 488-89 (1991).
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government directly.225 Additionally, although the suit is brought
against the employee, one may not execute a judgment against the
employee absent proof of actual malice. 226 Concomitantly, the
local government is obligated to defend its employee if he or she
acted within the scope of employment and must indemnify the
employee if a judgment is returned against him or her.227
The LGTCA permits the government employer, in defending
the employee, to raise any defenses or immunities held by the
employee, "even where those defenses or immunities could not
have been vicariously asserted by the employer to bar respondeat
superior liability at common law.,,228 Accordingly, even though
the local government, as employer, is not liable in tort actions for
the tortious conduct of its employees under the doctrine of
respondeat superior,229 it may assert the individual's potential
defenses on the employee's behalf.
The procedural provisions of the LGTCA apply to "all torts
without distinction, including intentional and constitutional
torts,,,230 and any judgment arising from such claims must be paid
by the municipality, not the individual defendants. 231
1.

Governmental Functions vs. Proprietary Functions

The sovereign immunity of the State extends to its agencies
"but not to its creatures, such as municipal corporations, except
when [they are] exercising some governmental function of the state
itself.,,232 Until the early "twentieth century local governments
generally had no immunity under Maryland common law in either
tort or contract actions.,,233 But the Court of Appeals extended the
State's sovereign immunity to municipalities when their employees
perform "a purely governmental function,,234 and thus are acting as
an extension of the State itself. In this context, the immunity is
more properly identified as "governmental" rather than

225.

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Martino, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 723; Williams v. Montgomery County, 123 Md. App.
119,129,716 A.2d 1100, 1105 (1998), ajJ'd sub nom., Williams v. Maynard, 359
Md. 379, 754 A.2d 379 (2000).
Williams, 123 Md. App. at 126, 716 A.2d at 1103.
Id. at 126, 716 A.2d at 1103.
Pavelka v. Carter, 996 F.2d 645,649 (4th Cir. 1993).
Martino, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 721; Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 53,
405 A.2d 255, 256 (1979).
Thomas v. City of Annapolis, 113 Md. App. 440, 457, 688 A.2d 448, 456 (1997).
Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70,123-24,660 A.2d 447,473-74 (1995).
Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rei. Blueford, 173 Md. 267, 271,195 A. 571, 574
(1937).
Hous. Auth. of Baltimore v. Bennet, 359 Md. 356, 358, 754 A.2d 367, 368
(2000).
Town of Brunswick v. Hyatt, 91 Md. App. 555,559,605 A.2d 620, 622 (1992).

2006]

Governmental Immunity in Maryland

65

"sovereign,,,235 and the immunity "is limited to tortious conduct
that occurs in the exercise of a 'governmental' rather than
'proprietary' function.,,236 The immunity afforded to local
governments is considered to be "much narrower than the
immunity of the State.,,237
Local governments, then, have common law immunity only for
acts that are governmental, not for acts that are proprietary or
private, and "they do not have immunity from liability for State
constitutional tortS.,,238 Thus the law related to the immunity of
local governments depends on this distinction, one that "is
sometimes illusory in practice. ,,239 In 1937, the Court of Appeals
offered a test to assist parties in determining whether a function
was governmental or proprietary,240 which it later simplified to be:
"[W]hether the act performed is for the common good of all or for
the special benefit or profit of the corporate entity.,,241
For historical reasons that are not well documented or
articulated, in Maryland a municipality has a "private proprietary
obligation,,242 and "may be responsible for protecting individuals
who are physically within the bounds of a public way from hazards
caused by the governmental entity which may come from outside
the boundaries of the public way . . . and should have been
foreseen and prevented by the governmental agency.,,243
Therefore, "a municipality is not immune from a negligence action
arising out of its maintenance of its public streets and

235.

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

241.
242.
243.

Heffner v. Montgomery County, 76 Md. App. 328, 333 n.4, 545 A.2d 67,67 n.4
(1988) ("Traditionally, sovereign immunity was the term used to describe that
immunity enjoyed by the State while govemmental immunity was the term used
to refer to the immunity enjoyed by a county or municipality."); see also Austin
v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 53,405 A.2d 255, 256 (1979).
Austin, 286 Md. at 53, 405 A.2d at 256.
Bd. of Educ. v. Mayor of Riverdale, 320 Md. 384, 390, 578 A.2d 207, 210
(1990).
Baltimore Police Dep't v. Cherkes, 140 Md. App. 282, 314, 780 A.2d 410, 429
(2001) (citing DiPino v. Davis, 354 Md. 18,51-52,729 A.2d 354, 372 (1999».
E. Eyring & Sons Co. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 253 Md. 380, 382, 252 A.2d 824,
825 (1969).
In Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rei. Blueford, 173 Md. 267,195 A. 571 (1937),
the Court of Appeals held:
Where the act in question is sanctioned by legislative authority, is
solely for the public benefit, with no profit or emolument inuring to
the municipality, and tends to benefit the public health and promote
the welfare of the whole public, and has in it no element of private
interest, it is governmental in nature.
173 Md. at 276, 195 A. at 576.
Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 539, 547, 479 A.2d 1321, 1326 (1984).
Higgins v. City of Rockville, 86 Md. App. 670, 679, 587 A.2d 1168, 1172
(1991).
Mayor of Baltimore v. Whalen, 395 Md. 154, 167,909 A.2d 683, 691 (2006).
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highways,,,244 even though the building and maintenance of public
streets and sidewalks is primarily for the public benefit and
promotes public safety and welfare. Although there is little
evidence that any municipality incurs a profit or compensation for
road building, government'!-l immunity is not available to local
.
governments for this function. 245
But most other local government activities are considered to be
governmental. For example, the operation and maintenance of a
public park is unquestionably a Rovernmental function,246 as well
as the operation of a day camp,24 a town pool,248 a police force,249
a courthouse,250 and a transportation service. 25 I
This rather antiquarian notion of the governmental-proprietary
distinction has been criticized as being illogical and cumbersome.
In 1979 Judge Eldridge, of the Court of Appeals of Maryland,
noted "the unsoundness of the governmental-Psroprietary
distinction,,,252 a sentiment echoed by Judge Cole. 53 Judge
Eldridge made the point again in 1984, stating:
[T]hat the governmental-proprietary distinction is
an irrational basis for determining whether local
governments may be held liable in tort. The
governmental-proprietary distinction, which has
never been expressly sanctioned by the Maryland
Legislature, was adopted by the Court relatively
recently in history and with little reasoning. The
distinction has proven to be unsound, and it should
be abandoned. 254
His view is that the concept suffers from the fact that the Court has
not been able to arrive at a satisfactory definition for the
244.

245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

252.
253.
254.

Higgins, 86 Md. App. at 678, 587 A.2d at 1172 (emphasis added). A
municipality's proprietary duty "to keep streets ... safe ... for ... travel"
extends "to the land immediately contiguous to these public ways." Mayor of
Baltimore v. Eagers, 167 Md. 128, 136, 173 A. 56, 60 (1934).
Irvine v. Montgomery County, 239 Md. 113,118,210 A.2d 359, 362 (1965).
Whalen, 395 Md. 154,909 A.2d 683.
Austin v. Mayor of Baltimore, 286 Md. 51, 64-66,405 A.2d 255,262-63 (1979).
Town of Brunswick v. Hyatt, 91 Md. App. 555, 564-65, 605 A.2d 620, 624-25
(1992).
Williams v. Prince George's County, 112 Md. App. 526,549-50, 685 A.2d 884,
896 (1996).
Harford County v. Love, 173 Md. 429, 433, 196 A. 122, 124 (1938).
Pavelka v. Carter, 996 F.2d 645, 648 (4th Cir. 1993). But see Anne Arundel
County v. McCormick, 323 Md. 688, 696, 594 A.2d 1138, 1142 (1991) (holding
that the decision to purchase self-insurance for workers' compensation liability is
a proprietary function).
Austin, 286 Md. at 72, 405 A.2d at 266 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
ld. at 83 (Cole, J., dissenting).
Tadjer v. Montgomery County, 300 Md. 539, 555, 479 A.2d 1321, 1329 (1984)
(Eldridge, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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distinction, and consequently, as a test for liability, it IS
"unsatisfactory and illogical.,,255
It appears that this "illogical exception to th[ e] rule [of
governmental immunity] is too well settled . . . , to be now
questioned or discussed;,,2s6 it "seems destined to remain with us
for the foreseeable future.,,257

2.

Limitation on Recovery

Recovery under the LGTCA is limited to $200,000 per
individual claim and $500,000 per total claims arising from a
single incident, regardless of the number of claimants. 258 As with
the MTCA, there is no Maryland appellate case that has addressed
this issue in a death case under the LGTCA, but the principles
discussed in Part II(B)(l) would similarly apply to LGTCA claims.
Interpretation of these statutory limitations is analogous to the
insurance limitations in the private sector. The limitation terms of
both the MTCA and the LGTCA represent a per person policy
limit, and because, in any given death case, only one person, the
decedent, suffers bodily injury, his beneficiaries are entitled to
make only one claim. Consequential damages are computed as
part of the single bodily injury claim of which they are a
consequence, and do not represent a separate claim.259
The LGTCA states "the liability of a local government may not
exceed $200,000 per an individual claim. ,,260 This language
contemplates an individual bodily injury. Indeed, this limitation is
usually reflected in a county's insurance policy because that is the
full extent of a county's potential exposure by operation of law.
3.

Notice Requirements

Section 5-304 of the LGTCA requires that a claimant gIve
notice of a claim within 180 days of injury. 261 The statute
designates which individual in various counties is the proper

255.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Austin, 286 Md. at 72, 405 A.2d at 266 (Eldridge, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Judge Wilner has been the most recent Court of Appeals
judge to question the doctrine's utility. See Mayor of Baltimore v. Whalen, 395
Md. 154, 171-72, 909 A.2d 683, 693-94 (2006) (Wilner, J., concurring).
Mayor of Baltimore v. State ex rei. Blueford, 173 Md. 267, 273,195 A. 571, 574
(1937) (quoting Lave v. Minn. State Agric. Soc'y, 64 N.W. 382, 383 (1895)).
Higgins v. City of Rockville, 86 Md. App. 670, 680, 587 A.2d 1168, 1173
(1991).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-303(a)(I) (2002).
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scherr, 101 Md. App. 690, 697, 647 A.2d 1297,
1300 (1994).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-303(a)(\) (2002) (emphasis added).
[d. § 5-304(a).
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recipient of the claim. 262 However, a claimant may be entitled to
file suit without giving the proper notice because the statute
includes a Waiver of Notice provision. 263 Under this provision, a
defendant must show that it was prejudiced by the lack of notice,
providing the plaintiff shows good cause why the notice was not
filed. 264
. '
.
4.

Local Government Insurance

The Local Government Insurance Trust (LGIT) is a non-profit
insurance group that pools insurance premiums for many Ma7sland
local governments, including counties and local entities. 2 5 It
provides coverage for general liability, employee liability,
automobile liability, and property.266 Some local governments are
self-insured rather than insured by LGIT. 267
E.

Transportation Article Waiver ofImmunity

Governmental entities may also be sued under section 17-1 07 (c)
of the Transportation Article of the Maryland Annotated Code,
which prohibits both state and local governments from asserting
sovereign immunity "with respect to the security that state law
requires all vehicle owners . . . including governmental ones, to
pOSt.,,268 Section 17-107 prohibits two things: First, drivers may
not drive cars they know are uninsured, and owners may not permit
And second, no
their uninsured vehicles to· be driven. 269
governmental owner of a motor vehicle "may ... raise the defense
of sovereign or governmental immunity . . . in any judicial
proceeding" in which it is claimed that personal injury or property
damage was "caused by the negligent use of [a] motor vehicle
while in government service or performing a task of benefit to the
government. ,,270
This provision prevents Maryland's governmental entities from
asserting sovereign immunity and thus being excused from
insuring their vehicles, and ensures that motorists benefit from the
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

269.
270.

Id. § 5-304(b).
Id. § 5-304(c).
Id.
Local Government Insurance Trust, http://www.lgit.org/about/overview.htm (last
visited Dec. 30, 2006).
Id.
But see id., http;//www.lgit.org/about/membecdirectory.htm (last visited Dec.
30,2006) (containing a list oflocal governments insured by LGIT).
Pavelka v. Carter, 996 F.2d 645, 648 (4th Cir. 1993). The Transportation Article
requires vehicle owners, including the government, to carry minimal insurance
coverage. MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §17-I03(a)(2006).
MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. § l7-107(a).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-524 (2002); MD. CODE ANN., TRANsP. §
17-107(c).

2006]

Governmental Immunity in Maryland

69

protections and potential recovery that Title 17 is intended to
provide. 271
For these purposes, sub-section 17-107 (c) "puts
governmental vehicle owners . . . in the same position as private
owners .... ,,272
The Legislature intended to provide citizens minimal recovery
for injuries resulting from the negligence of governmental
drivers. 273 It is the owner of the motor vehicle that is forbidden
from raising the defense of sovereign or governmental immunity,
not the employee-driver. 274 Local government employees do not
enjoy common law immunity for their negligent driving acts, but
are entitled to indemnification from the local government employer
pursuant to the LGTCA. 275 State employees who drive negligently
may assert the immunity provided by statute, if they were acting in
the scope of their employment and without malice or gross
negligence. 276
In addition, operators of emergency vehicles are immune from
suit in their individual capacity from negligent acts or omissions
committed while operating the emergency vehicle "in the
performance of emergency service," but the governmental owner is
still liable for resultant damages under the terms of § 17-103. 277
If a suit is filed involving a governmental vehicle under this
section, the maximum recovery available is $20,000 per person,
per motor vehicle accident ($40,000 total), and $15,000 in total
property damage. 278 A plaintiff is not required to give any notice
claim to the liable governmental entity before suing under this
provision. 279
In order to take advantage of the "more expansive waiver of
immunity" provided by the MTCA,280 an injured motorist must
comply with the MTCA's notice provisions. Compliance with the
notice provisions of the LGTCA, on the other hand, does not
expand the waiver of the immunity enjoyed by a county, since the
LGTCA does not waive immunity to begin with. 281

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.

See Pavelka, 996 F.2d at 650.
!d.
!d.
[d.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-302; Pavelka, 996 F.2d at 650.
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-522(b).
[d. § 5-639.
MD. CODE ANN., TRANSP. §17-103(b).
See Maryland v. Harris, 327 Md. 32,41,607 A.2d 552,557 (1992).
Pavelka v. Carter, 996 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Maryland v. Harris,
327 Md. 32, 38,607 A.2d 552,555 (1992).
Pavelka, 996 F.2d at 649.
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State Law Provides Other Immunity for Government
Employees

Similar to the· United States Code, the Annotated Code of
Maryland contains various other immunities for government
employees and officials. . For example, the Courts & Judicial
Proceedings Article, Title 5, Subtitle 5, entitled "Immunities and
Prohibited Actions-Governmental" provides numerous other
specific forms of immunity.282 Here we find such items as
immunity for the Department of Liquor Control for Montgomery
County,283 for members of military courts,284 and for county
boards of education. 285 And other code sections may overlap. For
instance, the Education Article provides sovereign immunity for "a
county board of education" 286 and for county board employees. 287
Accordingly, practitioners must search the code when bringing or
defending tort suits to ensure that he or she considers the impact of
every applicable section on the litigation.
Additionally, government employees in Maryland may
frequently be entitled to assert common law "public official"
immunity from negligence torts extending beyond the
governmental entity itself when they exercise discretionary
functions. 288 The functions of most high ranking government
officials and all police officers are discretionary.289 But employees
who perform "ministerial" functions, and who are not considered
"public officials" are not entitled to this immunity.290 Thus, for a
defendant to establish that he is entitled to the defense of public
official immunity, he must show that: (1) He is a public official,
(2) the conduct complained of was discretionary in nature, and (3)
the act(s) he performed were within the scope of his official

282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

289.

290.

MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 5-501 to 5-527 (2002).
Id. § 5-504.
Id. § 5-513.
Id. § 5-518(b).
MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 4-105(d)(2004).
Id. § 4-106(a).
Pavelka v. Carter, 996 F.2d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 1993); Thomas v. City of
Annapolis, 113 Md. App. 440,452,688 A.2d 448, 454 (1997); see also Lovelace
v. Anderson, 126 Md. App. 667,692,730 A.2d 774, 787 (1999), ajJ'd in part,
rev'd in part and remanded by 366 Md. 690, 785 A.2d 726 (2001); Williams v.
Mayor of Baltimore, 128 Md. App. 1, 14-19, 736 A.2d 1084, 1091-94 (1999),
ajJ'd in part, rev'd in part, 359 Md. 101, 753 A.2d 41 (2000).
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-511(b); see also Lovelace, 126 Md. App.
at 692, 730 A.2d at 787 (holding that the immunity under § 5-511 (b) applies to
Maryland police officers); Bradshaw v. Prince George's County, 284 Md. 294,
302-03, 396 A.2d 255, 260-61 (1979), abrogated by Cox v. Prince George's
County, 296 Md. 162,460 A.2d 1038 (1983).
Pavelka, 996 F.2d at 649 (holding a bus driver is an employee who performs
ministerial functions).
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duties. 291 Officials of "governmental entities,,292 have a similar
defense established by statute. 293
Like state statutory immunity, public official immunity is
qualified; that is, it only provides a shield from liability as long as
the official acted without malice or gross negligence. 294
G. Federal Common Law Provides Qualified Immunity for State
Government Actors Alleged to Have Committed Violations of
the United States Constitution

A federal statue, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, authorizes suits against state
and local officials and, in certain cases, local governments for
violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights. The statute
reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immumtIes secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress .... 295
Section 1983 allows a person to make a claim for relief against a
government official who, acting under color of state law, violated
the person's federal constitutional or statutory rights. 296 To state a
claim, the plaintiff must allege (1) a deprivation of a federal right
and (2) that "the person who ... deprived him of that right acted
under color of state ... law.,,297 More specifically, a plaintiff must
plead and prove four elements:
1. conduct by a "person;" 298
29l.
292.

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.

Thomas, 113 Md. App. at 452,688 A.2d at 454.
See MD. CODE ANN., art. 26, § I(b) (2005) (providing the definition of
governmental entity).
ld. §§ 2-3; MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-511(b).
Livesay v. Baltimore County, 384 Md. I, 12,862 A.2d 33, 39 (2004); Lovelace,
366 Md. 690 at 714, 785 A.2d at 739.
42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000).
ld.
Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980).
The word "person" under § 1983 does not include a state agency, or a state
official sued in an official capacity. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491
U.S. 58, 61 (1989). However, municipalities and municipal officials sued in
either an official or personal capacity are "persons" under § 1983. See Monnell
v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978) (noting that local
governments have historically enjoyed less immunity protection than other
sovereigns).
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2. who acted under "color of law;"
3. that proximately caused;
4. a deprivation of federally protected rights. 299
A wide range of federal constitutional and federal statutory
rights may be enforced through § 1983 suits,300 and § 1983 applies
to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Because §
1983 itself does not create federally protected rights, a complainant
must allege the constitutional or federal statutory basis for his or
her claim. 301 Indeed, the Supreme Court in § 1983 cases requires
that judicial "analysis begin[] by identifying the specific
constitutional [or statutory] right allegedly infringed by the
challenged [conduct]." 302
While § 1983 is a powerful tool for plaintiffs to use in suing
governmental agents in Maryland, its application is tempered by
. well-established defenses. In addition to the usual defenses
available in tort cases, § 1983 defendants are entitled to assert the
common law defenses of absolute or qualified immunity. 303
"Judges, prosecutors~ witnesses and legislators" are generally
entitled to assert absolute immunity; "executive and administrative
officials may assert qualified immunity.,,304
The State of Maryland cannot be sued under § 1983 because it
is not a "person" and because it is protected by the Eleventh
Amendment. 305 However, a municipal government may be liable
under § 1983 if a plaintiff alleges, and can prove, that the
unconstitutional action he complains of "resulted from a CountY
policy, practice or custom.,,306 Such proof must ordinarily consist
299.
300.

301.

302.

303.
304.

305.
306.

MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, 21ST ANNUAL SECTION 1983 CIVIL RiGHTS LITIGATION,
VOL. 1 at 45 (2004).
MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, § 2
(4th ed., vol. 1 2004).
See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329,340 (1997) (must allege violation
of a federal right, not just violation of federal law); Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S.
439,464 (1991) (claim for violation of dormant Commerce Clause); Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (claims for violation of Fourth
Amendment); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1,4,7,11-12 (1980) (wide array of
federal statutory rights enforceable under § 1983).
Graham, 490 U.S. at 394. Note also that violations of state law are not
enforceable under § 1983. See, e.g., Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142
(1979). However, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over § 1983 claims.
Nat'l Private Truck Council v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 588 (1995).
State court defendants sued under § 1983 may remove the case to federal court.
28 U.S.c. § 1441 (a)-(b) (2000).
Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 163-64 (1992).
See SCHWARTZ, supra note 299, at 67. For an interesting discussion about the
disjointed manner in which the Supreme Court has developed § 1983 immunity
principles, see Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with
Special Attention to Sources o/Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 51, 66-70 (1989).
See supra Part II(C).
Williams v. Prince George's County, 157 F. Supp. 2d 596, 601 (D. Md. 2001);
see also Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978).
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of evidence that a local government operates according to a policy
statement, ordinance, or regulation that "is both fairly attributable
to the municipality as its own and is the moving force behind the
specific constitutional violation. ,,307 When a municipal policy is
itself unconstitutional because it directs or authorizes employees to
commit constitutional violations, a plaintiff is not required to also
show that the policy caused his or her constitutional injury.308
A judicially created creature, the qualified immunity defense
involves the balancing of an individual's right to vindicate his or
her federal rights with the social need to allow officials to exercise
discretion and perform their duties without apprehension of
liability.309 One commentator asserts that "[ q]ualified immunity
may well be the most important issue in § 1983 litigation," and
notes that many § 1983 cases are disposed of in favor of
defendants based on the qualified immunity defense. 310
Qualified immunity is not only immunity from liability, but also
from suit itself and from "the other burdens of litigation.,,311 A
form of common law immunity, the Supreme Court determined in
1982 that qualified immunity should be available to § 1983
defendants whose actions, even if unconstitutional, were
objectively reasonable. 312 These cases often arise in the context
of law enforcement activity. An example is one in which police
officers shot a suspect they discovered hiding in a dark closet
holding a long metal object. 313 The officers were entitled to
qualified immunity from suit for shooting the suspect because their
belief that he had a shotgun was objectively reasonable. 314 In
reality, the suspect was holding a vacuum cleaner hose. 315
Whether a defendant is entitled to qualified immunity is a legal
question to be decided by the court and is often presented in a
motion for summary judgment. In analyzing whether the defense
is available, the court must engage in a two-step analysis. The
court must first determine if the complaint states a violation of
federally protected rights. 316 If there has been no violation, the
complaint fails to state a claim and the application of the immunity

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

Williams, 157 F. Supp. 2d at 601 (citing Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380, 1387
(4th Cir. 1987)).
Monell, 436 U.S. at 661.
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232,239-41 (1974).
Schwartz, supra note 299, at 70.
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 (1982).
Cf Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 790 (4th Cir. 1991) (suspect in a car).
Cf id. at 791-92.
Cf id. at 790 (in reality the suspect was holding a wooden night stick).
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
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defense is essentially unnecessary. 317 The court should dismiss the
claim on a defense motion. 318 Even if the defendant-official did
violate the plaintiff s constitutional or statutory rights, he is still
entitled to immunity if his actions were objectively reasonable
under the circumstances. 319
One indicia of objective reasonableness is whether the law that
the official allegedly violated was "clearly established" at the time
of the events underlying the claim. 320 This is known as the "fair
warning" test, to ensure that the official was on notice of the state
of the law so as to realize whether he violated the law.321 Further,
the defendant's subjective motivation behind his actions is
irrelevant to the defense because the immunity is evaluated on an
objective basis, even though the court's inquiry is fact-specific.
Because qualified immunity is immunity from suit, a § 1983
defendant may immediately appeal a pre-trial denial of a motion
asserting the defense. 322
In Harlow v. Fitzgerald,323 the Supreme Court explained that it
assumed that the 42nd Congress was aware of, and intended for,
common law tort immunities to apply to § 1983 actions, as they are
procedurally treated as involving claims for personal injury and are
thus referred to as "constitutional torts." 324 The Court has
developed a functional approach to immunity. 325 An immunity
defense is available if the official would have been immune from
tort liability in 1867 and if that immunity is consistent with the
policy goals underlying § 1983. 326
Section 1983 suits create significant social costs to the benefit
of individuals. A large number of these suits are filed, creating a
strain on the judicial system. 327 The cases are expensive to litigate
and those eXEenses are often borne by the state and local
governments. 3 8 Requiring public officials to participate in the
litigation diverts them from their official functions and the threat of
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Id. at 194,201; see also Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 552 (1985).
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526.
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.
!d. at 201.
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 19.29 (1983).
Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 306 (1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 530 (1985».
457 U.S. 800 (1982).
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 321, at § 19.28.
Id.
Id.
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (1982).
!d.; see also Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of
Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 650-51 (1987).
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suit may intimidate them in performing those public duties. 329
Finally, without qualified immunity, individuals would be reluctant
to serve in public employment. 330
Thus, when a state actor has committed a constitutional
violation, the state actor is protected by qualified immuni~ so long
as the state actor acted reasonably, even if mistakenly. 3 1 Some
commentators have asserted that this principle seriously limits the
success that § 1983 plaintiffs may realize and that it may not have
a legitimate, historical place in § 1983 litigation. 332
Relatively modern principles of tort law seem to underlie the
Supreme Court's extensive application of the qualified immunity
defense. 333 The line of cases that has created "a pure federal law
of immunities,,334 has made it more difficult for civil rights
plaintiffs to recover damages. Qualified immunity has been
criticized, not only for "limiting official accountability for
unconstitutional conduct,,,335 but also for limiting the remedial
purposes of § 1983 and changing substantive constitutional law.
CONCLUSION
Sovereign immunity has been described as "so complex" in its
"legal idiosyncrasies.,,336 The FTCA is referred to as "a statute of
unique complexity,,,337 while the MTCA has its own special
quirks. The waiver of sovereign immunity found in the MTCA is
not found in the LGTCA. The immunity to which federal, state,
and local employees are entitled varies not only with their
employment status, but with their particular function, the cause of
action alleged, and the legal standard of review used to analyze
their conduct.

329.
330.
331.
332.

333.
334.
335.

336.
337.

Harlow, 457 U.S. at 814 (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.
1949)).
Id.
Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205-06 (200 I); Waterman v. Batton, 393 F.3d 471,
476-77 (4th Cir. 2005).
David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court:
Judicial Activism and the Restriction a/Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV.
23, 27 (1989) (qualified immunity "directly limits individual liability for
constitutional violations by denying a damage remedy for conduct that violates
the Constitution").
Beermann, supra note 304, at 67.
Id. Beermann criticizes the Court for making policy with development and
application of qualified immunity. Id.
Rudovsky, supra note 332, at 27 ("Qualified immunity has emerged as one of the
most significant and problematic defenses to claims of civil rights violations.");
Beermann, supra note 304.
Boger et ai, supra note 11, at 507.
!d. at 533; see also Santoro, supra note 64, at 224 ("[T]here are certain
peculiarities of the Act which can make litigating a tort case against the
government a set of traps for the unwary.").
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A recent simple automobile tort case illustrates these
complications. Plaintiff was involved in a minor motor vehicle
accident with a County Deputy Sheriff in a county in which the
Sheriff is the chief law enforcement officer. There is no county
police department. Prior to filing suit, plaintiff makes a claim
pursuant to the LGTCA, addressed to the County Attorney. The
County Attorney infonns her that Deputy Sheriffs are state
constitutional officers and thus state employees, and that she must
satisfy the prerequisites of the MTCA before filing suit.
Plaintiff makes a claim to the State Treasurer, pursuant to the
MTCA. The Insurance Division of the State Treasurer's Office
denies the claim, noting that when perfonning law enforcement
functions, as opposed to "traditional" Sheriffs Office duties,
Deputy Sheriffs are insured by the county in which they work,
although Sheriffs are state employees for purposes of MTCA
statutory immunity. The Treasurer refers plaintiff back to the
county, and plaintiff makes another LGTCA claim to the county.
The county denies the claim, and plaintiff files a negligence suit
in the District Court of Maryland, naming the county as defendant.
The county moves to dismiss, arguing that the county is immune
from suit for the governmental function of law enforcement, and
that only an employee can be sued. Plaintiff re-files the suit,
naming the individual Deputy Sheriff as defendant.
The Deputy Sheriff moves to dismiss based on public official
and MTCA immunity for state personnel, and prevails. If the
statue of limitations has not run out, the plaintiff re-files her suit
against the State of Maryland, the employer of state personnel. If
the plaintiff gets a judgment in her favor, the plaintiff will have to
detennine whether to execute that judgment against the SITF or the
county, which must indemnify its employees.
"Immunity ... plays a vital role in our system; it is not so much
a barrier to individual rights as it is a structural protection for
democratic rule.,,338 But if attorneys do not understand the
intricacies of this area of the law, and do not understand how to use
the principles to prosecute or defend civil litigation against the
government, individual rights may be compromised, as well as the
effective functioning of the government itself. Statutory and
common laws have, for the most part, struck an appropriate
balance between the two-a balance that is fascinating in its
delicacy.

338.

Krent, supra note 1, at 1530.

